The Relationship Between Risk Attitudes and Heuristics in Search Tasks: A Laboratory Experiment by Schunk, Daniel & Winter, Joachim
Daniel Schunk und Joachim Winter:
The Relationship Between Risk Attitudes and Heuristics
in Search Tasks: A Laboratory Experiment
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2007-9
Department of Economics
University of Munich
Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Online at http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1377/
The Relationship Between Risk Attitudes and Heuristics
in Search Tasks: A Laboratory Experiment∗
Daniel Schunk∗∗
University of Mannheim
Joachim Winter†
University of Munich
This version: February 22, 2007
Abstract: Experimental studies of search behavior suggest that individuals stop search-
ing earlier than predicted by the optimal, risk-neutral stopping rule. Such behavior could
be generated by two different classes of decision rules: rules that are optimal conditional
on utility functions departing from risk neutrality, or heuristics derived from limited cog-
nitive processing capacities and satisficing. To discriminate among these two possibilities,
we conduct an experiment that consists of a standard search task as well as a lottery
task designed to elicit utility functions. We find that search heuristics are not related to
measures of risk aversion, but to measures of loss aversion.
Keywords: search; heuristics; utility function elicitation; risk attitudes; prospect theory
JEL classification: D83; C91
∗ The authors would like to thank Daniel Houser, Oliver Kirchkamp, Joerg Oechssler, Robert Sugden,
Martin Weber, Matthias Weiss, and seminar participants at the University of Mannheim, George
Mason University’s ICES, the 2004 meetings of the Eastern Economic Association, the 2004 Annual
Conference of the European Network for Training in Economics Research (ENTER), as well as the 2004
North American Meeting of the Economics Science Association (ESA) for their comments. Financial
Support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) via the Sonderforschungsbereich 504 at
the University of Mannheim is gratefully acknowledged.
∗∗ Corresponding author.
Address: Sonderforschungsbereich 504
University of Mannheim
D-68131 Mannheim, Germany
E-mail : dschunk@uni-mannheim.de
Web: www.mea.uni-mannheim.de/daniel-schunk
Fax : +49-621-181-3451
† Address: Department of Economics
University of Munich
D-80539 Munich, Germany
E-mail : winter@lmu.de
E-mail : www.vwl.uni-muenchen.de/ls empwi/Personen/winter/winter.htm
Fax : +49-89-2180-3954
The Relationship Between Risk Attitudes and Heuristics
in Search Tasks: A Laboratory Experiment
1 Introduction
Behavior in search situations receives much attention in various fields of economics, such
as labor economics and marketing science.1 But behavior in search tasks is interesting
not only for the analysis of many substantive issues, it has also proven a useful object of
behavioral research in psychology and economics. Search tasks are attractive for experi-
mental studies because of their (superficially) simple structure that masks an underlying
optimization problem that is quite complicated and in most cases cannot be solved in
a human’s mind but requires numerical methods and a computer. Conceptually, search
tasks are representative of many situations in which one has to decide between committing
resources to an attractive proposition or deferring the decision in the hope of receiving a
better deal.
Price search situations and variations thereof – such as the well-known secretary problem,
in which the decision whether to stop or to continue depends only on the relative ranks of
the presented alternatives (e.g., Rapoport and Tversky, 1970; Seale and Rapoport, 1997)
– have been investigated theoretically and empirically by numerous authors, e.g., Stigler
(1961), Braunstein and Schotter (1982), Hey (1981, 1982, 1987), Kogut (1990), Harrison
and Morgan (1990), Schotter and Braunstein (1981), Sonnemans (1998, 2000), and Houser
and Winter (2004). Since individual price search behavior is difficult to examine in the
field, research on price search is generally based on experimental studies. The existing
experimental evidence suggests that people are very heterogeneous in their search behavior
and that relatively simple heuristics describe observed behavior better than the optimal
stopping rule. It has been found, though, that subjects’ search behavior is nearly optimal
in the sense that their actual earnings are close to the earnings they would have realized
had they followed an optimal strategy. This observation, however, does not indicate that
their stopping rule is necessarily close to the optimal rule – it could also be that the payoff
1 See Eckstein and van den Berg (2007) and Zwick et al. (2003) for reviews of the literature in these
fields.
to search tasks is not very sensitive to deviations from the optimal stopping strategy (see
Harrison and Morgan, 1990; Seale and Rapoport, 1997, 2000). Overall, while people seem
to behave as predicted by theory when parameters of the search environment change (e.g.,
Schotter and Braunstein, 1981), experimental findings in various search contexts suggest
that individuals tend to search too little relative to the optimal strategy (Hey, 1987; Cox
and Oaxaca, 1989; Houser and Winter, 2004; Seale and Rapoport, 2000; Sonnemans,
1998). Cox and Oaxaca suggest that this might be traced back to risk-averse behavior of
the individuals (Cox and Oaxaca, 1989). Using an electronic information board method,
Sonnemans (1998) finds that differences in learning behavior of the subjects might also
be responsible for the observation of early stopping.
The existing experimental literature on search behavior is based on the assumption of risk
neutrality. Under risk neutrality, optimal stopping rules can be derived, and experimental
studies typically find that most subjects do not use such rules but rather follow some
heuristic. These heuristics are often sophisticated in the sense that they allow subjects to
get quite close to the payoffs they would have obtained using optimal rules. However, once
one allows for heterogeneity with respect to the individual risk attitudes, the situation
is more complicated: Decision rules that have been treated as heuristics in the literature
could, in fact, be optimal conditional on the individual risk attitude. Consequently,
search behavior that cannot be explained by the optimal stopping rule derived under risk
neutrality could be generated by two entirely different classes of decision rules: (i) rules
that are optimal conditional on the individual utility function or (ii) heuristics that derive,
say, from satisficing or other cognitive processes. Distinguishing these two possibilities
requires an independent measure of risk attitudes.
The contribution of our paper to the search literature is, therefore, to study the relation
between properties of subjects’ preferences (specifically, measures of risk attitude) and
decision rules used in search tasks. We do this by presenting subjects not only with a
search task that follows the standard in the literature, but also with a lottery task that
serves to elicit subjects’ individual utility functions. In addition, we use a questionnaire to
obtain a psychometric measure of risk attitudes as an independent individual-level source
of information on risk behavior.
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In section 2, we present the design of our experiment. Section 3 describes our procedures
to draw inferences on subjects’ search behavior and risk attitudes. In section 4, we link
these elements and discuss the results of our experiment. Section 5 concludes.
2 Design and Administration of the Experiment
Our experiment consists of three parts (A, B, and C) that were presented to the subjects
in fixed order. Part A of the experiment serves to elicit features of subjects’ preferences,
namely, the shape of their utility functions in the gain and loss domains. Part B consists
of a series of repeated price search tasks that is used to identify subjects’ search heuristics.
Part C is a survey instrument developed in the psychology literature to generate a measure
of subjects’ risk behavior. We describe these three parts in turn.
2.1 Parts A: Preferences
Part A builds on a method recently proposed by Abdellaoui (2000). A series of lottery
tasks serve to elicit subjects’ utility and probability weighting functions in a parameter-
free way. In part A, we elicit each subject’s utility function on the gain and loss domain,
using a series of 64 lottery choice questions in total. Four of the lottery questions appear
twice during the lottery elicitation process. This gives us the possibility to investigate
whether subjects behave consistently during the utility elicitation questions, or whether
preference reversals have occurred.2
The experiment used in Part A for the elicitation of subjects’ utility function is based
on the construction of “standard sequences of outcomes”, i. e., monetary outcomes that
are equally spaced in terms of utility. In our design, we use a 5-step bisection procedure
to determine an outcome x1 that makes the subject indifferent between two lotteries
A = (x0, p;R, 1− p) and B = (x1, p; r, 1− p); where p is set to 2/3 and we have 0 ≤ r <
2 In our experiment, we also elicited each subject’s probability weighting functions for gains and losses
through a series of 72 lottery choice questions. Since subjects’ probability weighting functions are not
of interest in this study, we do not discuss results from these additional lottery tasks. The results from
our probability weighting function elicitation are comparable to the results reported by Abdellaoui
(2000); in particular, our estimates of the shape of the probability weighting function are similar to
those obtained by Abdellaoui. The results of the probability weighting function elicitation part of the
experiment can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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R < x0 < x1. The parameters r, R, and x0 are held fixed during the whole experiment.
The first 5 presented lottery-pairs let us determine the desired x1 that makes the subject
indifferent between the lotteries A and B, see the Appendix for an example of the sequence
of lotteries. The next step of this procedure is to present another 5 pairs of lotteries in
order to determine a value x2 that makes the subject indifferent between the lotteries
(x1, p;R, 1 − p) and (x2, p; r, 1 − p). This procedure continues until we have determined
an x6. In our experiment, we set (in the gain domain) R to e100, r to e0, and x0 to
e200. In the loss domain, we use the negative of these values.
Now, assume that preferences can be represented by cumulative prospect theory (CPT).3
Let u(·) denote the utility function on the gain or the loss domain and let w(·) denote the
probability weighting function for the respective domain. Then indifference between two
lotteries implies pairs of equations of the following type:
w(p)u(xi) + (1− w(p))u(R) = w(p)u(xi+1) + (1− w(p))u(r) (1)
w(p)u(xi+1) + (1− w(p))u(R) = w(p)u(xi+2) + (1− w(p))u(r) (2)
From these two equations follows:
u(xi+1)− u(xi) = u(xi+2)− u(xi+1) (3)
That is, in terms of utility, the trade-off of xi for xi+1 is equivalent to the trade-off of xi+1
for xi+2. This method yields a standard sequence of outcomes, {x0, x1, ..., x6}, which is
– by construction – increasing for gains and decreasing for losses.4 Note that the range
of monetary outcomes in the elicitation procedure is specific for each subject, since it
depends on individual decisions.
2.2 Part B: Search Behavior
In part B of the experiment, subjects perform a sequence of search tasks. Each subject’s
goal is to purchase an object which they value at e500. This article is sold at infinitely
3 The elicited utility function on gains is, indeed, a von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Equation
(3) holds also under Expected Utility Theory, as can be found by substituting p for w(p) in equations
(1) and (2).
4 A standard sequence {x0, x1, ..., xn} requires the construction of n such indifferences (xi, p;R, 1 − p)
and (xi+1, p; r, 1− p).
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many locations, and visiting a new location costs e1. At each location, a price is ran-
domly drawn from a known distribution. On the instruction sheet, subjects are informed
graphically and verbally that the price at each location is drawn independently from a
truncated normal distribution with a mean of e500, a standard deviation of e10, and
truncation at e460 and e540. The distribution is discretized such that only integer prices
are realized.
After each new price draw (that is, at each location they visit), subjects are allowed to
recall previously rejected price offers. That is, after each price draw, subjects can stop
and choose any price (location) encountered so far, or they can continue their search at
the incremental cost of another euro. The outcome of each search task is calculated as
the evaluation of the object (e500) minus the price at the chosen location minus the
accumulated search cost.
Note that we allow for recall in order to be closer to situations such as price-search in
the internet: Indeed, in real-world situations, individuals can often perform their search
and compare offers as long as they want; at a certain moment, they decide to stop their
search and choose one of the offers that they have come across during their search.
Conceptually, the search problem presented in Sonnemans (1998, 2000) and Schunk (2006)
is similar to our search task: The number of searches is unlimited, recall is accepted, the
costs of one search action is constant and the price at each location is drawn independently
from a distribution that is known to the searcher. In contrast to our setup, however, the
price offers are drawn from a discrete uniform distribution in Sonnemans’ experiments on
search. In Hey (1982), the subjects also face an identical situation; however they do not
know that the distribution of prices is normal (without truncation).
To ensure that subjects were experienced with the task and comfortable with the computer
interface, and to minimize the impact of learning, subjects were allowed to perform an
unlimited number of practice search tasks before performing a sequence of 10 or 11 tasks
that determined their payoff for part B of the experiment.5 Finally, after the experiment
was completed, one of these rounds was selected randomly to determine the part B pay-off.
5 35 subjects played ten search rounds, and the second half, another 33 subjects, played 11 payment-
relevant search rounds.
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2.3 Part C: Risk Attitudes
The experiment ends with a short computerized questionnaire (part C). This survey in-
strument for assessing risk-taking was developed by Weber et al. (2002). Subjects rate
their behavior with respect to 4 risky activities in the behavioral risk domain of gambling.
Specifically, subjects report how likely it is that they engage in a certain gambling-related
activity on a five-point rating scale ranging from 1 (“Extremely likely”) to 5 (“Extremely
unlikely”)6.
Risk attitude is generally considered to be domain-specific in recent psychological litera-
ture (e. g., Bromiley and Curley, 1992). Based on our questions, we have a psychometric
measure for individual risk attitude in the gambling domain. In our subsequent analy-
sis, we correlate these measures with measures of risk attitudes obtained using the lottery
tasks of part A and with behavior in the search tasks observed in part B of the experiment.
2.4 Administration
The study was conducted in the fall of 2003 in the experimental laboratory of Sonder-
forschungsbereich 504, a research center at the University of Mannheim. In four sessions,
a total of 68 subjects participated in the main study.7 These subjects were recruited from
the general student population. All experiments were run entirely on computers using
software written by the authors.
All payments were made after subjects had completed all parts of the experiment. For
each subject, the outcome of one of the 10 or 11 payment-relevant search tasks in part B
was selected randomly, and added to or subtracted from a flat e8 show-up fee, depending
on whether it was a gain or a loss. Subjects were told that their total payoff was truncated
at e0.8 That is subjects would not suffer a loss from the experiment, they would at least
6 Based on subjects’ ratings in the risk domains (i) financial, (ii) recreational, (iii) social, (iv)
health/safety, and (v) ethical., Weber et al. (2002) construct domain-specific scales of subjects’ risk
attitudes and evaluate the construct validity and the consistency of these scales using standard ap-
proaches. However, for our purpose, only the domain of gambling risk is of interest.
7 A separate group of 5 subjects participated in a pilot study which allowed for fine-tuning of the
parameters of the lottery and search tasks, the adjustment of the software, and optimization of the
experimental protocol.
8 The lowest payoff that was paid in all sessions was e4, so no subject was forgiven any losses.
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earn e0 from the experiment. Finally, one of the (on average) 17 subjects participating
in each experimental session was randomly selected to play for a real monetary pay-off
based on his or her choices made in one of the lottery tasks in parts A of the experiment;
answers were collected as binary choices between two prospects, i.e. only the preferred
lottery was played for real pay-off. Since the outcomes of the lotteries were up to e6000,
we informed the subjects that the randomly selected person played for only 1% of the
positive outcomes (i. e., the gains) presented in the lotteries.
3 Inference on Search Heuristics and Risk Attitudes
In this section, we discuss how we use the data from our experiment to draw inferences on
subjects’ preferences (the shape of their utility functions, as revealed in the lottery tasks)
and behavior (the heuristics they use in solving the search task). The last subsection
briefly explains how the psychometric measures of subjects’ risk attitudes are obtained.
3.1 Estimation of the Shape of the Utility Function
As mentioned in section 2.1, the lottery tasks presented in part A of our experiment are
based on those developed by Abdellaoui (2000). He uses his experimental data to estimate
utility functions in the gain and loss domain as well as the corresponding probability
weighting functions nonparametrically. For the purpose of our study, we need to order
subjects according to their risk attitudes. We therefore use a parametric approach and
specify the subjects’ risk attitude based on the functional specification of a utility function
with constant absolute risk aversion form (CARA). We estimate the utility function in
the gain and loss domains separately using nonlinear least squares and the data from part
A of the experiment.
We should point out that the procedure we use to elicit the shape of the utility function
(Part A) operates on a monetary range of gains and losses that is different from the range
considered in the search experiments (Part B). We made this decision on purpose, and
we digress here for a brief discussion of the rationale for this decision. As pointed out by
Wakker and Deneffe (1996), the curvature of the utility function is more pronounced if a
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sufficiently wide interval of outcomes is investigated. Accordingly, our adaptive method
elicits individuals’ utility functions for monetary outcomes in a wide interval (the size of
which depends on the subjects decisions, see Abdellaoui (2000)) below e-200 or above
e200, respectively. In the search game, where actual payments were made, we had to
reduce the outcome scale between e-40 and e40 because of budget limitations. It may well
be the case that individual risk attitudes are different for high and low monetary outcomes.
However, all we need for our empirical analysis is that the rank order of individuals by
the measures of risk attitudes is preserved between the high-outcome range for which it
is elicited and the low-outcome range that is relevant for the analysis of behavior in the
search game.9 This is, in our view, a reasonable assumption and, in fact, a corollary of
using a CARA-utility specification. Furthermore, using data from high and low outcome
risk elicitation tasks by Holt and Laury (2002), this assumption can be investigated. The
results are supportive, and are presented in section 5 of this paper.
Based on, e. g., Currim and Sarin (1989) and Pennings and Smidts (2000), we assume the
following exponential specification for our CARA-utility function on gains10:
u(x) =
1− e−γ(x−xGmin)
1− e−γ(xGmax−xGmin) (5)
Here, xGmax is the largest elicited value of x in the gain domain (in absolute values), i. e., x6;
xGmin is the smallest elicited x-value on the gain domain, i. e., x0. For obtaining the utility
function in the loss domain, we replace xGmax and x
G
min by x
L
max and x
L
min, respectively, we
use the absolute value of the denominator and the numerator and we take the negative
of the right-hand side. For γ = 0 the function is defined to be linear, i. e., the subject is
risk-neutral.
In our specification, the coefficients are estimated separately for gains and losses (γ and
δ, respectively). These coefficients characterize each subject’s risk attitude in the sense
9 Accordingly, our empirical analysis will only be based on rank correlations, that is “comparative risk
aversion”.
10 Note that another normalized version of the CARA-utility has the following form:
u(x) =
1− e−γ
x−xG
min
xGmax−xGmin
γ
(4)
Fitting this function yields a significantly higher mean relative standard error of the coefficient estimate
and a significantly lower coefficient of determination than fitting the functional form in equation (5).
The substantive conclusions of our analysis remain unchanged when we use the form (4).
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of an Arrow-Pratt-measure (Pratt, 1964) of risk attitude, that is −u′′(x)/u′(x) = γ for
gains and −u′′(x)/u′(x) = δ for losses. If γ < 0, the subject has a convex utility function
and is risk-seeking on gains, if γ > 0, the subject is risk-averse, her utility function on
gains is concave.
Furthermore, we calculate an individual-specific index for loss aversion from our data. Be-
cause subjects generally evaluate their choice options relative to salient reference points,
Tversky and Kahneman propose that individuals process losses differently than gains
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). That is, loss aversion can be considered a psychological
factor, capturing the trade-off between gain- and loss-utility units. Generically, loss aver-
sion is defined by u(x) − u(y) ≤ u(−y) − u(−x) for all x > y ≥ 0 (Schmidt and Traub,
2002).
Based on work by Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Koebberling and Wakker (2005) propose
an index of loss aversion that is – in contrast to other indices discussed in the literature
– invariant to changes in the scale of the utility function, u(·), and it is invariant to scale
transformations of the outcomes. This index is given by
λ =
u′↑(0)
u′↓(0) . (6)
Based on Koebberling and Wakker (2005) and our utility elicitation procedure, the index
of loss aversion has the following form for γ 6= 0 and δ 6= 0:
λ =
δ·(e−δ·(|xL−xLmin|))
1−e−δ·(|xLmax−xLmin|)
γ·e−γ(xG−xGmin)
1−e−γ·(xGmax−xGmin)
(7)
For γ = 0, we have u′↓(0) = 1
xGmax−xGmin
, for δ = 0, we have u′↑(0) = 1|xLmax−xLmin| entering
expression (7) in the denominator and numerator, respectively.
Note that our estimate of individual loss aversion is based on the assumption that the
estimated form of the CARA-utility function of the individual is characteristic for her
utility function over the whole domain, and identically scaled both on gains and on losses11.
11 Our estimates of loss aversion are based on the assumption that the combination of our utility elicita-
tion method and Koebberling and Wakker’s (2005) index for loss aversion yields a reasonable overall
estimate of comparative individual loss aversion. Our findings on psychometric risk attitudes, reported
later, support this claim. We acknowledge, however, that methods for the elicitation of an index of
loss aversion that based on mixed lotteries (e. g., Schmidt and Traub, 2002), though also suffering from
considerable uncertainty, could also be used in the context of a search experiment; Schunk (2006) uses
9
3.2 Classification of Decision Rules Used in the Search Task
The next step of our analysis is to determine, for each subject, the decision rule he or
she uses in the search task. We specify a fixed set of candidate decision rules, comprised
of the optimal decision rule and several simple heuristics that have been used in the ear-
lier literature (e. g., Hey, 1982; Moon and Martin, 1990; Houser and Winter, 2004) to
describe search behavior. For each subject and each candidate decision rule, we com-
pute the number of stopping decisions that are correctly predicted. We assign to the
subject the decision rule that generates the largest fraction of correct predictions, i. e.,
that fits observed behavior best. We start this subjection with the derivation of decision
rules both under risk neutrality and without restrictions on individual risk attitude. The
derivations are based on the assumption of a classical von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function which is only defined on monetary gains since our experimental design implies
that searchers cannot suffer a loss from the experiment. For the derivation of the decision
rules, we consider two cases: In the first case, the cost of each completed search step are
treated as sunk cost; in the second case, we derive the finite horizon optimal stopping rule
assuming that subjects do not treat past search cost as sunk costs. Finally, we discuss
the set of alternative heuristics, and describe our classification procedure more formally.
Stopping Rules in Search Tasks under Risk Neutrality
Assume that the searcher observes sequentially any number of realizations of a random
variable X which has the distribution function F (·). In our case, F (·) is a discrete trun-
cated normal distribution with mean e500 and standard deviation e10, the truncation
is at e460 and e540. Let the cost of searching a new location be c. Assume that at
some stage in the search process, the minimal value that the searcher has observed so
far is m, and the searcher wonders whether to continue searching or whether to stop the
search. Basic search theory assumes that individuals treat the cost of each search step,
mixed lotteries in an experimental study on search behavior that uses a different design to elicit indi-
vidual preferences. We suggest that further experimental studies investigate the relationship between
loss aversion indices derived from mixed lotteries (e. g., Schmidt and Traub, 2002) and indices derived
from outward methods and pure lotteries, such as the method applied in the present paper.
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once completed, as sunk costs (Lippman and McCall, 1976; Kogut, 1990) and compare
the payoff of one additional search step with the payoff from stopping.12
Then, subjects solve the problem based on a one-step forward-induction strategy and the
expected gain from searching once more before stopping in a search task such as ours,
G(m), is generally given by:13
G(m) = − [1− F (m)]m︸ ︷︷ ︸N −
∫ m
460
xdF (x)︸ ︷︷ ︸L −c+m. (8)
The term
⊗
accounts for the case where a value larger than m is found with probability
(1 − F (m)). In this case, m remains the minimum price. The term ⊕ stands for the
case where we find a lower value than m and calculates the expected value in this case.
After some manipulation, we obtain the following condition for the parameter values of
our search task,
G(460) = −c < 0. (9)
That is, it does not make sense to continue searching if one draws the minimal value of
e460. In our specification, the highest price that can be drawn is e540. In this case,
the expected gain from searching at least one more time is always positive (since payoffs
cannot become negative), so
G(540) > 0. (10)
From these properties of G(·), it follows that there exists a unique value at which G(·) = 0.
We denote this value by m∗ and solve equation (8) for m∗. Straightforward manipulation
shows that the solution to this problem is identical to solving the following problem for
m:
pi(500−m+8) = (1−F (m))pi(500−m− c+8)+
∫ m
460
pi(500− x− c+8)dF (x)(11)
12 Kogut’s (1990) findings show that a certain proportion of subjects does not treat sunk costs as sunk.
13 Note that the one-step forward induction strategy is identical with the optimal solution of the infinite
horizon problem if the searcher is risk-neutral.
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Here, pi(·) is the payoff-function from the search game and the show-up fee of e8 is
included in this equation, since subjects’ payoff from the search game is directly linked to
the show-up fee. pi(·) has the following form:
pi(x) = max{0, x} (12)
In equation (11), the left-hand side of the equation is the payoff from stopping and the
right-hand side denotes the payoff from continuing search. We find that the optimal
strategy is to keep searching until a value of X less than, or equal to, the optimal value
m∗ has been observed. In our problem, we find that m∗ = 490. That is, we have the
following optimal decision rule for a risk-neutral searcher: Stop searching as soon as a
price less than or equal to e490 is found.
Now, consider that subjects do not treat search costs as sunk costs. That is, for their
decision whether to stop or to continue the search, they consider the total benefits and
costs of search; the agent stops searching only if the stopping value is higher than the
continuation value. In this case, subjects would not search for more than 48 steps since
after 48 search steps the continuation value from the experiment would definitely be zero.
It follows that the problem is treated as a finite horizon problem that is solved backwards.
Define St = {t,m} as the agents’ state vector after making t search steps.
After the agent has stopped searching, she will buy the item and receive a total payoff of:
Π(St) = max{0, 500−m− t · c+ 8}. (13)
Now, the agent stops searching only if the continuation value of search is lower than the
stopping value. The recursive formulation of the decision problem is therefore:
Jt(St) = max{Π(St), E[Jt+1(St+1)|St]}. (14)
E(·) represents the mathematical expectations operator, and the expectation is taken with
respect to the distribution of St+1|St. Again, this problem has, at every t, the reservation
price property. The reservation price begins at 490, then starts decaying slowly, reaches
483 in the 24th round and then decays at a rate of about one per round from that point
forward.
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Stopping Rules in Search Tasks Without Restrictions on Risk Attitudes
The derivations above are based on the assumption of a risk-neutral searcher. Sonnemans
(1998), for example, refers to a model of the form (8) as an optimal stopping rule. Houser
and Winter (2004) refer to a model of the form (14) as an optimal stopping rule. Note,
however, that it is individually rational to use the risk-neutral optimal stopping rule only
for risk-neutral subjects. Put differently, observing a subject that does not follow the
optimal stopping rule derived under risk neutrality does not necessarily imply that his or
her search is not rational.
As a more general case, we therefore consider a searcher with an arbitrary, monotone
utility function u(·). If the searcher ignores sunk cost and takes her decisions based on a
one-step forward-looking strategy, the equation that determines her reservation price m∗
has the following form, which is an immediate extension of equation (11)14:
u(500−m+8) = (1−F (m))u(500−m− c+8)+
∫ m
460
u(500− x− c+8)dF (x)(15)
Equation (15) can be solved numerically for the reservation price m∗(η), given a specific
price distribution, search costs, and a utility function on gains that is characterized entirely
by a parameter η. The problem has the constant reservation price property, which is
reported as a search heuristic that is consistent with the behavior of a reasonable number
of subjects in other studies (e. g., Hey, 1987). Figure 1 shows the constant reservation
price as a function of the risk-parameter γ in the exponential utility function (5). Note
that the reservation price m∗(η) is invariant to changes of scale of the utility function.
Henceforth, we will refer to rules of this type as forward optimal rules, keeping in mind
that this rule is only optimal conditional on the individual utility function and on the
assumption of a one-step forward strategy that ignores sunk costs.
Analogous to our derivation of the optimal search rule in the risk-neutral case, we now
consider the case in which subjects do not treat search costs as sunk costs. Again, we
14 Note that this equation does not characterize the optimal solution to the search problem. It gives,
however, the optimal strategy for a searcher with arbitrary risk-attitude who ignores sunk costs and
who uses a one-step forward induction strategy.
13
have a finite-horizon problem that is solved using backward induction. After the agent
has stopped searching, she will buy the item and receive a total payoff of:
Πu(St) = max{0, u(500−m− t · c+ 8)}. (16)
The agent stops searching only if the utility of continuing the search is lower than the
utility from stopping. The recursive formulation of the decision problem is:
Jut = max{Πu(St), E[Jut+1(St+1)|St]}. (17)
Again, this problem has, at every t, the reservation price property. The monotonically
falling reservation price for all arbitrary values of γ implies that the agent should not
exercise recall. Figure 2 plots the path of reservation prices, calculated by solving the
dynamic discrete choice problem implied by equation (17) for various risk attitudes γ of
the individual. Henceforth, we will refer to rules of this type as backward optimal rules,
which are optimal conditional on the individual utility function. From our theoretical
deliberations so far we can conclude that – regardless of what type of optimal rule subjects
use, forward or backward optimal rules – risk averse subjects should stop their search
earlier, i. e., they have higher reservation prices on average, and risk-seeking subjects
should stop their search later, that is they use lower reservation prices.
Alternative Search Rules
As has been pointed out in the search literature before, and as should have become
clear in the previous sections, computation of the optimal search rule (either under risk
neutrality or without restrictions on the risk attitude) is a demanding task, and it is
unlikely that subjects can perform this task during a search experiment (or in real-life
search situations, for that matter). Most papers in search literature therefore argue that
subjects use heuristics rather than the optimal stopping rule, and there is some evidence
that certain heuristics get subjects close to the pay-offs they could have obtained using
the optimal rule.
We now specify our set of candidate search rules that are used in this paper to characterize
behavior in experimental search tasks. In addition to the search rules that have been
derived in the section above, we specify a set of heuristics that have been used in the
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search literature to characterize behavior in experimental search tasks. These heuristics
are based on experimental work by Hey (1982) and Moon and Martin (1990).
The first class of these decision rules comprises several “sophisticated” heuristics. These
heuristics share the constant reservation price property. Each rule says that the subject
uses an arbitrary, but constant reservation value r ∈ {480, .., 500}. Subjects behaving
according to this heuristic search until a price quote lower than or equal to the reservation
price is found. We refer to this constant reservation type of heuristic as type 1 heuristics.
Note that this heuristic is identical to the forward optimal search rule, see above. Based
on this rule, we attribute to every individual the constant reservation price value that
explains most of her observed search decisions.15
The second class of decision rules that we consider are based on the finite horizon search
model, i. e., the backward optimal search rules, as specified above. According to these
search rules, subjects use a reservation price that is a function of the search step t and of
the individual risk attitude γ that characterizes the utility function for which the search
rule has been derived. Here, we consider that γ ∈ {−1.0,−0.95,−0.9, ...,+0.95,+1.0}.
We refer to this class of decision rules as type 2 rules. Based on this rule, we attribute
to every individual a value γsearchi , the risk-attitude coefficient that explains best the
observed search behavior.
A third class of heuristics is also based on reservation prices that vary over the search
time. Subjects using one of these heuristics stop searching as soon as their payment
exceeds a certain individual threshold (or satisfaction-) level t ∈ {1, .., 20}. Given our
parametrization of the problem, this results in a reservation price that linearly falls over
time. For obvious reasons, this heuristic is sometimes called the “satisficer heuristic” and
we refer to it as type 3 heuristics .
As type 4 heuristics , we consider the so-called “bounce rules”, suggested by Moon and
Martin (1990) based on earlier work by Hey (1982). Subjects following the “one-bounce
rule” (heuristic 4a) have at least 2 searches and they stop if a price quote is received larger
15 As is clear from the solution to equation (15), each constant reservation price used in the price search
problem is consistent with a certain (interval of) value(s) of the individual utility risk coefficient γ in
the gain domain. Instead of attributing a constant reservation price to the people, we could as well
attribute the value of γ that corresponds to this constant reservation price.
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than the previous quote. The “modified one-bounce rule” (heuristic 4b) is similar to the
one-bounce rule, but an agent following this rule stops only if a price quote is received
larger than the previous quote less the search cost.
Finally we consider rules that are based on winning streaks (type 5 heuristics). Subjects
who follow this type of heuristics stop searching if they receive two (heuristic 5a) or
three (heuristic 5b) consecutive price draws that are below some fixed threshold level p ∈
{485, .., 500}. That subjects might use these streak-based rules in search situations can be
motivated by results from psychological research on behavior in uncertain environments,
see Rabin (2002).
We should note that the type 4 and 5 heuristics have also been used to describe behavior in
search environments in which the distribution of prices is not known. In our environment,
where subjects know the expected value and variance of the price distribution, using these
rules makes less sense. A priori , we would therefore not expect that these heuristics are
used frequently by our subjects.
Table 1 presents a summary of the 116 candidate decision rules (optimal stopping rule
and heuristics) that we specify for the subsequent analysis.
Classification Procedure
Our approach to drawing inferences about search behavior is to determine, for each sub-
ject, the proportion of choices consistent with each decision rule and then to maximize
this proportion over the set of all candidate decision rules. We assume that each subject
follows exactly one of the decision rules in our universe of candidate rules and that he or
she uses the same heuristic in each of the 10 or 11 pay-off tasks. This latter assumption
seems reasonable in view of the fact that all subjects are experienced when they begin
the pay-off tasks.
Formally, our classification procedure can be described as follows.16 Each heuristic ci ∈ C,
where C is the set of all search rules described above, is a unique map from subject i’s
information set Sit to her continuation decision dit ∈ {0, 1} : dciit (Sit) → {0, 1}. Now, let
16 Houser and Winter (2004) implement a similar classification procedure in a completely specified
maximum-likelihood framework.
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d∗it denote the observed decision of subject i in period t. Then, we can define the indicator
function:
Xciit (Sit) = 1(d
∗
it = d
ci
it (Sit)) (18)
Let Ti be the number of decisions that we observe for subject i. We attribute to each
subject the heuristic that maximizes the likelihood of being used by that subject:
cˆi = argmax
ci∈C
Ti∑
t=1
Xciit (Sit) (19)
As we have motivated by reference to the existing literature, all relevant search heuristics
should be included in our universe of 116 candidate decision rules. Based on our classi-
fication procedure, we attribute a decision rule to each subject, i. e., we can classify the
subjects by the decision rules that they use. We can then investigate for each subgroup
and for the whole sample the relationship between the observed search behavior and the
risk preferences of the individuals.
3.3 Psychometric Measures
The questionnaire was constructed so that respondents evaluate their likelihood of en-
gaging in an activity of the gambling-domain on a five-point rating scale ranging from 1
(“Extremely likely”) to 5 (“Extremely unlikely”). For each subject, we calculate a mea-
sure of risk attitude as the arithmetic mean score of the response to the four questions.
4 Results
This section starts with self-contained descriptions of both the results of the utility func-
tion elicitation (Part A) and the classification of the search behavior (Part B). We continue
with a comparative analysis of our results on preferences and behavior (also including the
psychometric measure of risk attitude).
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In our experiment, 68 subjects participated in total. Of these 68 subjects, we delete four
subjects from the sample.17 These 4 subjects apparently did not take the utility elicitation
part of the experiment seriously.
The 64 subjects that we keep in the sample show a preference reversal rate of 21.9% on
gains and 23.4% on losses in the utility function elicitation part of the experiment.18
4.1 Part A: Preferences
In Table 2, we report the standard errors of the nonlinear least squares estimates for the
risk coefficients γ and δ. Furthermore, we report the sum of the squared residuals (SSR)
and the coefficient of determination R2. We see that the standard errors are reasonably
low and that the coefficients of determination are close to 1 for our nonlinear regressions.
The estimation results suggest that the risk coefficients are reliable measures that allow
for a rank-ordering of individuals according to their risk-attitude. Our results support
the hypothesis of diminishing sensitivity for gains and losses if we consider the whole
sample. Similar to Abdellaoui (2000), who uses a different measure for the classification
of subjects’ risk attitudes, we see a preponderance of risk-averse subjects in the gain
domain, and a preponderance of risk-seeking subjects in the loss domain. Overall, our
results on individual preferences are consistent with the predictions of prospect theory
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and subsequent experimental work based on prospect
theory.
17 Two of these subjects are outliers in terms of the time needed for the completion of the lottery
questions: They needed less than 60 seconds for either the 32 lottery questions on gains or the 32
questions on losses – considerably less than the other participants in the experiment who needed at
least 1 minute 41 seconds. The two other subjects are outliers in terms of the standard error of the
coefficient estimates of the utility function: Their standard errors of the coefficient estimate is more
than one standard deviation larger than the standard errors of coefficient estimates for all the other
subjects, i.e. preference parameters are measured imprecisely. Additionally, these two subjects are the
only ones in the sample that revealed preference reversals on all four consistency check questions (see
the section 2.1).
18 The reversal rate is a measure for how consistent subjects behave in a certain utility elicitation mech-
anism. Our reversal rate is somewhat higher than the rate in Abdellaoui (2000), who finds an error
rate of 17.9% on gains and of 13.7% on losses. Abdellaoui’s overall error rate, including the probability
weighting function elicitation part of the experiment, is 19%. However, our reversal rate is lower than
that of Camerer (1989), who reports that 26.5% of the subjects reversed preferences.
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4.2 Part B: Search Behavior
A natural starting point for the investigation of search behavior is to assume that all
subjects use a heuristic of the constant reservation price type, i. e., a type 1 heuristic.
The reservation value that has been attributed to each subject can be considered a proxy
for whether subjects tend to be early stoppers or late stoppers: The higher the attributed
reservation price, the earlier subjects stop.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of reservation prices in the sample of 64 subjects, obtained
under the assumption that each subject follows a constant reservation price decision rule.
We find that 55% of the subjects are classified as “early stoppers”, i. e., their attributed
reservation price is higher than the risk-neutral optimal reservation price of e490. 3% use
the risk-neutral optimal reservation value and 42% are “late stoppers” with a reservation
price lower than e490. Furthermore, note that if subjects use the risk-neutral optimal
reservation stopping rule with a reservation price of e490, they should stop, on average,
after having seen 5.85 prices. We find that the mean number of observed price draws per
round is 5.07. The preponderance of early stoppers relative to the risk neutral constant
reservation price stopping rule confirms results from earlier experimental studies of search
behavior (Hey, 1987; Cox and Oaxaca, 1989; Sonnemans, 1998).
Next, we classify subjects according to the decision rule they use in the search tasks (see
Table 3). Figure 4 shows the number of subjects for whom a certain heuristic is a “best”
heuristic (numbers in parentheses indicate the fraction of correctly explained choices for
the particular subjects). We find that for the 13% of the subjects, a constant reservation
price heuristic explains behavior better than all other heuristics, for 3% a type 2 rule (the
optimal finite horizon rule) is better than all others, and for 16% a satisficer rule (type
3) explains more observations than all other rules. For 84% of all subjects one of the
conditionally optimal rules (type 1 or type 2) is a best decision rule, for 63% we find that
they use one of the optimal rules (type 1 or type 2) and do not use the satisficer-heuristic
(type 3); in contrast, 37% of the subjects can be termed satisficers – this result is similar
to Sonnemans (1998), who finds that about one third of the subjects’ behavior is most
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consistent with a satisficer rule. However, for 47% of the subjects, we cannot distinguish
between the use of a forward or a backward optimal search rule (type 1 or type 2).19
Compared to these figures, it may be somewhat astonishing that the bounce-rules (the
type 4 heuristics) and the streak-heuristics (type 5 heuristics) perform rather poorly: In
total, only 35.9% of the observed decisions are consistent with the one-bounce rule, 33.6%
are consistent with the modified one-bounce rule; 38.5% of the decisions are consistent
with a type 5a heuristic, and 39.4% with a type 5b heuristic. However, Hey (1982), who
has proposed the one-bounce rules following individual tape recordings of the subjects,
finds equally low levels of consistency in a search environment where the price distribution
was unknown.
In summary, heuristics of type 1, type 2, and type 3 do reasonably well in describing
observed behavior. However, for a certain proportion of the subjects, our data do not
discriminate between the usage of type 1 or type 2 or type 3 decision rules.20 As a result
of these findings, we classify the 64 subjects into 4 categories, labelled C1, C2, C3, and
C4, respectively:
C1 All subjects whose observed behavior is explained best by a type 1 heuristic (49
subjects).
C2 All subjects whose observed behavior is explained best by a type 2 heuristic (45
subjects).
C3 All subjects whose observed behavior is explained best by a type 3 heuristic (24
subjects).
19 Both, forward and backward optimal rules, have very similar reservation price paths that only differ
after a considerable number of search steps, see Figures 1 and 2. Therefore, the reported weak dis-
crimination between both types of rules does not come unexpectedly. Changes in the experimental
design will not improve the discrimination between these two types of rules: (i) A decrease in the
standard deviation of the price distribution decreases the number of search steps in which forward and
backward rules are identical (for identical parameter γ). However, a decrease in the price distribution
also leads to fewer search steps per individual (Hey, 1987), which then complicates discrimination. (ii)
An increase in the search costs per step decreases the number of search steps in which forward and
backward rules are identical (for identical parameter γ). However, an increase in the search costs also
leads to fewer search steps per individual (Hey, 1987), which, again, complicates discrimination.
20 Technically, the likelihood function is rather flat, although the different decision rules are asymptoti-
cally identified; see the discussion in Houser and Winter (2004).
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C4 Subjects whose observed behavior is explained best by a type 1 or a type 2 heuristic,
but not by a type 3 heuristic (40 subjects).
4.3 The Relationship Between Preference Parameters, Search Behavior, and
Risk Attitudes
The first question we investigate is whether there is a relationship between the observed
search behavior and the elicited individual preferences (i. e., the coefficient of risk atti-
tude). From the theoretical considerations above, the hypothesis follows that (at least)
for those subjects that are classified as users of one of the conditionally optimal search
rules (type 1 or type 2 rules), there exists an association between their risk attitude ob-
served in the utility function elicitation part of the experiment and their behavior in the
search experiment. We also extend this type of analysis to the whole sample. That is, we
implicitly assume that all subjects behave according to just one search rule, either a type
1, a type 2 or a type 3 rule. We should find for all subjects in the sample that risk averse
subjects generally use a higher reservation price or have a higher value of γsearch; subjects
classified as risk seeking should be attributed a lower reservation price or a lower value of
γsearch.
Since the assumption of a normal distribution of the observed individual parameters γ, δ
and λ across subjects is clearly rejected, we base part of our analysis on Spearman rank
correlation coefficients. The significance of the Spearman correlations is tested using the
null hypothesis that the two variables under question are independent.
We focus on the key parameters that characterize individual search behavior, the at-
tributed constant reservation price level (RP), the average number of search steps per
search round (AS) and the search coefficient γsearch. According to the basic search model
(15), we hypothesize that – at least for subgroup C1 – γ is positively correlated with RP
and negatively correlated with AS. We further hypothesize that at least for subgroup C2,
γ is positively correlated with γsearch and negatively correlated with AS. Furthermore,
due to being derived from the same underlying utility functional, the attributed con-
stant reservation price (RP) and the attributed γsearch are strongly positively correlated
(Spearman-ρ: 0.946, p-value: 0.00); we should therefore expect the hypothesized correla-
21
tions also for the subgroup C4. Table 3 reports the corresponding Spearman correlation
coefficients for all subgroups C1 through C4 and the whole sample.
Our data do not reject the hypothesis of independence between γ and the search param-
eters RP, AS, and γsearch for all subgroups and the whole sample. The finding from our
correlation analysis in Table 3 is that the utility function based measures for risk attitude
on gains and losses, do not exhibit any significant relationship with individual behavior
in search problems. This holds true regardless of whether we impose the usage of one
specific type of search rule (e. g., the one-step forward-optimal search rule) to all subjects,
or whether we attribute to each subject the type of rule that describes best her behavior
and then, consequently, only consider the respective subgroups of the sample. To fur-
ther investigate this point, we classify the subjects according to their risk attitude γ as
measured in the utility function elicitation part. t-tests under the assumption of different
variances show that our hypothesis motivated above – that risk averse (γ > 0) subjects
generally use higher reservation price levels (RP) than risk-seeking (γ < 0) subjects –
cannot be confirmed: The null hypothesis of equal mean reservation price levels is clearly
not rejected across all subgroups considered. Even stronger: The mean reservation price
of risk seeking subjects is higher than the mean reservation price of risk-averse subjects
across all subgroups and the whole sample.
We now consider the correlation between the psychometric measure for risk attitude in
the gambling domain and search behavior. There is some evidence that people who dislike
taking risks in the gambling domain tend to search less: For C2-subjects, we have a
Spearman-ρ of 0.26 (p-value 0.087) and for C4-subjects a Spearman-ρ of 0.29 (p-value
of 0.07) for the correlation between the measure for risk on gambling and the average
number of search steps per round (AS).21
With respect to the relationship between the utility function based risk measures and the
psychometric risk measures , we find that apart from the subgroup C4, the loss aversion
parameter does correlate at least marginally with the psychometric measure for risk on
gambling. If we consider the complete sample, we find a Spearman ρ of -0.32 and a p-
21 The corresponding Spearman-ρ and p-values for the C1- and C3-group and for the whole sample are
0.14 (0.337), 0.06 (0.76) and 0.16 (0.21).
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value of 0.009 for the correlation between the loss aversion parameter and the psychometric
measure for risk on gambling.22
In summary, our data do not confirm our hypotheses on the relationship between utility
function based measures for risk aversion and search behavior. However, in Table 3 we
do find significant relationships between the attributed constant reservation price level
(RP) and the loss aversion index λ derived from the utility function, as well as between
the average number of search steps (AS) and the loss aversion index. These correlations
are significant or at least marginally significant across all subgroups considered. For the
whole sample, we find significant correlations between the loss aversion index and both,
RP and AS. Across all subgroups, subjects with a higher degree of loss aversion tend
to have a higher attributed reservation price and stop their search earlier. Additionally,
subjects’ reported attitude towards risky gambles is related to their loss aversion and to
the average number of search steps that they perform: People who avoid gambles tend to
have a higher degree of loss aversion and they tend to stop their search earlier.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
This study combines elements from different literatures in experimental and behavioral
economics – a lottery-based experiment designed to elicit subjects’ individual utility func-
tions (in particular, to estimate an index of risk attitude) and a search experiment designed
to reveal subjects’ decision rules in a search task. These experiments are augmented with a
psychometric survey instrument that generates domain-specific measures of risk attitudes.
We should first point out that the results of each of these components are broadly in line
with earlier results in the literature. In particular, the data from our search experiment
confirm that subjects tend to search less often than predicted by the optimal decision rule
derived under the assumption of risk neutrality. Also, relatively simple heuristics, such
as the constant reservation price heuristic and the satisficer heuristic, describe observed
search behavior very well.
22 The corresponding Spearman-ρ and p-values for the subgroups C1, C2, C3, and C4 are -0.31 (0.032),
-0.37 (0.01), -0.38 (0.068), and -0.23 (0.153), respectively.
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The key question raised in this paper is whether the decision rules we observe in our data
correspond to optimal behavior of risk-averse subjects (even though they are not optimal
in the standard search model under risk neutrality). We therefore relax the assumption
of risk neutrality made in the standard search models. We allow for departures from risk
neutrality and develop optimal decision rules for such preferences. These decision rules
(type 1 and type 2 rules) classify the observed behavior of the largest part of our sample.
However, even the specifications of the generalized search models with risk aversion do not
seem to be able to describe search behavior observed in our experiment fully. Our analysis
rejects the hypothesized relationship between the individual preference parameter γ (the
measure for risk aversion) and various parameters that characterize the observed search
behavior over various subgroups under consideration.
This result may be disappointing. Since the search problem formally corresponds to a
generalized lottery task, and since both the lottery-based utility elicitation tasks and
the search tasks were performed in one experimental session, we should expect some
correlation between the parameters of the lottery-based utility function elicitation task
and characteristics of behavior in the search task at the subject level. However, while the
individual risk parameter γ does not correlate with individual search parameters, we find
that the loss aversion parameter λ does correlate with observed search behavior across
all subgroups considered. This latter parameter accounts for the fact that individuals
process losses differently than gains, and is related to the influential work on individual
preferences by Kahneman and Tversky that led to the development of prospect theory.
Conceptually, our results support other studies (e. g., Camerer, 2005; Kahneman et al.,
1991; Rabin and Thaler, 2001) that have suggested that loss aversion might be a major
factor in observed attitudes towards risk, at least for modest scales.
We conclude this section with a discussion of some restrictions of our experimental design
and of our analysis. First, a drawback of the procedure we used to elicit the shape of the
utility function is that it operates on a monetary range of gains and losses that is higher
than the range considered in the search experiment. While this separation is helpful
for experimental design and parameter identification purposes, it may be the case that
individual risk attitudes are different for high and low monetary outcomes. To allow for
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this possibility, we analyzed our data under the weak assumption that the rank order
of individuals by the relevant measure of risk attitude is preserved between the high-
outcome range for which it is elicited and the low-outcome range that is relevant for the
analysis of behavior in the search game.23 A less restrictive, but also much more costly,
experimental design would implement both the utility function elicitation procedure and
the search game on the same high payment scale, or on the same low payment scale. The
latter has been implemented in Schunk (2006), using a different utility function elicitation
procedure. The findings support all conclusions drawn in this paper.
Second, the classification method used to assign decision rules to subjects may seem
rather heuristic. For instance, depending on the set of candidate decision rules, this
procedure may result in over-fitting. In our data, over-fitting is not an issue – we end up
assigning subjects only to three classes of decision rules, and the variation within these
classes (i. e., the constant reservation price assigned to each subject) is akin to estimating
other preference parameters from experimental data. A final open issue of our analysis
of search behavior is the role of errors in decision-making – in general, allowing for errors
would tend to reduce the heterogeneity in preference parameters and decision rules. Using
more sophisticated statistical methods for the classification of decision rules that allow
for errors, as in Houser and Winter (2004) and Houser et al. (2004), is difficult given
the nature of objective functions in search tasks and unlikely to produce substantively
different results (Houser and Winter, 2004).
In summary, this study was motivated by the desire to understand search behavior and
its relation to individual preferences, in particular risk attitudes. We have been able
23 In order to investigate the appropriateness if using rank correlations, we conducted a secondary analy-
sis of the data presented by Holt and Laury (2002). In their experimental study, Holt and Laury elicit
three measures of risk aversion for each subject: two measures in a low-payoff condition as well as one
measure in a high-payoff condition. The latter involves payoffs that are either 20, 50, or 90 times the
amount of the low payoff condition. They also used both real and hypothetical payoffs.
When we re-analyze the data on those 187 subjects that were in a real payoff treatment (i.e. subjects
that earned real money for lottery participation) we find a Spearman correlation coefficient of 0.49
(p < 0.0000) between the first low-payoff risk attitude measure and the high-payoff risk attitude mea-
sure. For the second low-payoff risk attitude measure and the high-payoff risk attitude, the Spearman
correlation coefficient is 0.61 (p < 0.0000). Identical significance levels are found if we use only those
subjects that were in a hypothetical treatment. We conclude that individual measures of risk attitudes
elicited in low and high payoff situations exhibit a (stable) rank correlation. Further details of our
re-analysis of the Holt and Laury (2002) data are available on request.
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to replicate results from various previous studies on individual preferences and search
behavior. Our main methodological contribution is to combine experiments on preferences
and search so that correlations at the subject level could be analyzed. We find that there
is considerable difference in the strategies that subjects use to solve the search task. These
differences, however, do not seem to be systematically related to individuals’ risk attitude
elicited in lottery experiments. In contrast, we do find a relationship between the degree
of loss aversion revealed in the lottery tasks and search behavior. In addition, our results
suggest that a psychometric measure of their attitude towards risky gambles is also related
to observed behavior in the experimental search task.
According to Kahneman’s and Tversky’s prospect theory, the finding of a correlation
between individual loss aversion and search behavior suggests that reference point effects
play a role when solving the search tasks; subjects apparently do not solve the search
task only on the gain domain, as suggested by classical search theory. Schunk (2006)
constructs and experimentally tests a descriptive model of search behavior that accounts
for the observed reference points effects in search behavior and finds results that are in
line with the findings in this paper. Overall, this model provides a better empirical fit
than the standard model derived under risk neutrality or the extensions considered in the
present paper. Testing such models experimentally as well as combining psychometric and
decision-theoretic instruments for predicting behavior in sequential gambles should be the
focus of future research on search behavior in particular and dynamic choice behavior in
general. Furthermore, our findings are of interest for work in applied search theory, e.g.
consumer and labor search: Here, results on individual search behavior and preferences
might be helpful as a guide to econometric specifications that allow for heterogeneity, for
example with respect to individual search duration.
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FIGURE 1 
Optimal constant reservation price level depending on the individual risk coefficient γ 
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FIGURE 2 
Optimal reservation price path depending on individual risk coefficient γ 
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FIGURE 3 
Distribution of the constant reservation prices observed in the experiment. 
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TABLE 1 
Decision rules for the search problem 
 
 
Number Description Parameter Values 
1 Constant reservation price heuristic 
Stop searching as soon as a price below x € is 
found. 
 
x e {480,…, 500} 
2 Finite horizon optimal search 
Stop searching in search step t as soon as a price 
below the reservation price xt,γ €, as specified by 
the finite horizon search model, is found. 
 
γ e {-1.0, -0.95,…, 
+0.95, +1.0} 
3 Satisficer heuristic 
Stop searching as soon as the payoff from stopping 
exceeds a certain threshold level of x € 
 
x e {1,…, 20} 
4a One-bounce rule 
Have at least 2 searches and stop if a price quote is 
received larger than the previous quote. 
 
 
4b Modified one-bounce rule 
Have at least 2 searches and stop if a price quote is 
received larger than the previous quote less the 
search cost. 
 
 
5a Streak-based rule 
Stop searching as soon as 2 consecutive price draws 
that are below some fixed threshold level x € are 
received. 
 
x e {485,…, 500} 
5b Streak-based rule 
Stop searching as soon as 3 consecutive price draws 
that are below some fixed threshold level x € are 
received. 
 
x e {485,…, 500} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Utility function estimation results and risk classification of the individuals. 
 
 
Gains (γ) Losses (δ)
Median estimate 2.003E-04 2.045E-04
Mean R² 0.9949 0.9948
Risk averse 
subjects 63% 23%
Risk neutral 
subjects 15% 18%
Risk seeking 
subjects 22% 59%
Utility function
 
 T
A
B
L
E
 
3
 
C
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
p
a
r
a
m
e
t
e
r
s
 
(
r
e
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
p
r
i
c
e
,
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
s
e
a
r
c
h
e
s
,
 
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
γ
s
e
a
r
c
h
)
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
p
a
r
a
m
e
t
e
r
s
 
(
γ
,
 
δ
,
 
λ
)
 
b
y
 
s
u
b
g
r
o
u
p
.
 
Average Number of Searches
Spearman - ρ p-value Spearman - ρ p-value Spearman - ρ p-value
γ (Risk on Gains) -0.03 0.82 0.02 0.90 -0.05 0.72
δ (Risk on Losses) -0.03 0.83 0.14 0.34 -0.06 0.66
λ   (Loss aversion) 0.23 0.12 -0.25 0.08 0.21 0.15
γ (Risk on Gains) 0.02 0.90 0.00 0.99 0.06 0.72
δ (Risk on Losses) -0.03 0.87 0.11 0.48 -0.02 0.89
λ   (Loss aversion) 0.26 0.08 -0.30 0.04 0.21 0.16
γ (Risk on Gains) -0.19 0.39 0.34 0.10 -0.12 0.59
δ (Risk on Losses) -0.25 0.24 0.46 0.02 -0.17 0.43
λ    (Loss aversion) 0.35 0.09 -0.31 0.14 0.29 0.17
γ (Risk on Gains) 0.03 0.86 -0.18 0.26 0.05 0.76
δ (Risk on Losses) 0.05 0.77 -0.13 0.43 0.03 0.84
λ    (Loss aversion) 0.22 0.16 -0.33 0.04 0.14 0.39
γ (Risk on Gains) -0.07 0.56 0.09 0.47 -0.03 0.79
δ (Risk on Losses) -0.05 0.71 0.14 0.27 -0.44 0.73
λ    (Loss aversion) 0.28 0.02 -0.32 0.01 0.21 0.10
C3 (24)
C4 (54)
All (64)
Preference 
ParametersGroup (N)
C1 (49)
C2 (45)
Constant Reservation Price Search coefficient γsearch
 
TABLE A1 
Assessing x1 through bisection. An example of the Abdellaoui (2000) procedure. 
 
 
Question Alternatives Outcomes (€) Choice
number x1 e
1 A = (200, 2/3; 100, 1/3) [200, 1200] A
B = (700, 2/3; 0, 1/3)
2 A = (200, 2/3; 100, 1/3) [700, 1200] B
B = (950, 2/3; 0, 1/3)
3 A = (200, 2/3; 100, 1/3) [700, 950] A
B = (820, 2/3; 0, 1/3)
4 A = (200, 2/3; 100, 1/3) [820, 950] A
B = (880, 2/3; 0, 1/3)
5 A = (200, 2/3; 100, 1/3) [880, 950] B
B = (910, 2/3; 0, 1/3)
6
End [880, 910]
x1 = € 200, p = 2/3, r = 0, R = € 100  
